Combining statistical analysis with case studies of specific countries and territories, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan detail the factors enabling nonviolent resistance campaigns to succeed and, sometimes, fail. They find such campaigns present fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment, and higher levels of participation contribute to enhanced resilience, greater opportunities for tactical innovation and civic disruption (and therefore less incentive for a regime to maintain its status quo), and shifts in loyalty among opponents' erstwhile supporters, including members of the military establishment.
Chenoweth and Stephan conclude successful nonviolent resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies, which are less likely to regress into civil war. Presenting a rich, evidentiary argument, they originally and systematically compare violent and nonviolent outcomes in different historical periods and geographical contexts, debunking the myth that violence occurs because of structural and environmental factors and that it is necessary to achieve certain political goals. Instead, the authors discover, violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds.
|Publisher:||Columbia University Press|
|Series:||Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Series|
|Product dimensions:||6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.80(d)|
|Age Range:||18 Years|
About the Author
Erica Chenoweth is an assistant professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and an Associate Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Previously she taught at Wesleyan University and held fellowships at Harvard, Stanford, and the University of California at Berkeley.
Maria J. Stephan is a strategic planner with the U.S. Department of State. Formerly she served as director of policy and research at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) and as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and American University. She has also been a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Table of Contents
List of illustrations ix
List of Tables xi
Part I Why Civil Resistance Works 1
One The Success of Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns 3
2 The Primacy of Participation in Nonviolent Resistance 30
3 Exploring Alternative Explanations for the Success of Civil Resistance 62
Part II Case Studies 85
Introduction to the Case Studies 87
4 The Iranian Revolution, 1977-1979 92
5 The First Palestinian Intifada, 1987-1992 119
6 The Philippine People Power Movement, 1983-1986 147
7 Why Civil Resistance Sometimes Fails: the Burmese Uprising, 1988-1990 172
Case study summary 192
Part III The Implications of Civil Resistance 199
8 After the Campaign: The Consequences of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance 201
9 Conclusion 220