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Credible Threats in Negotiations: A Game-theoretic Approach / Edition 1
     

Credible Threats in Negotiations: A Game-theoretic Approach / Edition 1

by Wilko Bolt, Harold Houba
 

ISBN-10: 1402071833

ISBN-13: 9781402071836

Pub. Date: 08/31/2002

Publisher: Springer US

The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the

Overview

The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics -such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations- receive their most extensive treatment to date.
Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9781402071836
Publisher:
Springer US
Publication date:
08/31/2002
Series:
Theory and Decision Library C Series , #32
Edition description:
2002
Pages:
320
Product dimensions:
6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.03(d)

Table of Contents

List of Figures. List of Tables. Preface. Acknowledgments. 1. The essence of negotiation. 2. A bargaining model with threats. Part I: Exogenous disagreement outcomes. 3. The alternating offers procedure. 4. The Nash program. 5. Comprehensive bargaining problems. 6. Comparative statics. Part II: Endogenous Threats. 7. Commitment and endogenous threats. 8. Bargaining over wages. 9. The policy bargaining model. 10. Destructive threats. Appendices. References. Index.

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