Credible Threats in Negotiations: A Game-theoretic Approach

Credible Threats in Negotiations: A Game-theoretic Approach

by Wilko Bolt, Harold Houba

Paperback(Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2002)

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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781441953049
Publisher: Springer US
Publication date: 01/25/2011
Series: Theory and Decision Library C , #32
Edition description: Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2002
Pages: 320
Product dimensions: 6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

About the Author

Harold Houba is economist at the Centre of World Food Studies, Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. He was educated at Tilburg University, both Masters and Ph.D. and has been Assistant Professor of Economic Theory for about ten years at the department of Econometrics and Operations Research at the Vrije Universiteit. The list of topics published include Bargaining Theory and Game Theory, among other topics, in journals as European Economic Review, Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics and Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Wilko Bolt is economist at the Research Department of De Nederlandsche Bank in Amsterdam. He was educated at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, both Masters and Ph.D., and joined De Nederlandsche Bank afterwards. The list of topics published include Bargaining Theory and Monetary Economics among other topics, in journals as American Economic Review, European Economic Review and Economic Theory.

Table of Contents

List of Figures. List of Tables. Preface. Acknowledgments. 1. The essence of negotiation. 2. A bargaining model with threats. Part I: Exogenous disagreement outcomes. 3. The alternating offers procedure. 4. The Nash program. 5. Comprehensive bargaining problems. 6. Comparative statics. Part II: Endogenous Threats. 7. Commitment and endogenous threats. 8. Bargaining over wages. 9. The policy bargaining model. 10. Destructive threats. Appendices. References. Index.

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