One of the key supposed "platitudes" of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit forit is an achievement of sortsand yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all.
In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover, Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the problem of scepticism; metaepistemological scepticism; modal epistemology; and the problem of moral luck.
All epistemologists will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive contribution.
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||9.20(w) x 6.10(h) x 0.80(d)|
Table of Contents
1. Scepticism in contemporary debate
2. Closure and context
4. The source of scepticism
II. Epistemic luck
6. Two varieties of epistemic luck
7. Cognitive responsibility and the epistemic virtues
8. Scepticism and epistemic luck
9. Epistemic angst
Postscript: Moral luck