Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics
By Reinhard Selten (Editor), I. Eshel (Contribution by), J.W. Friedman (Contribution by), R. Gardner (Contribution by), P. Hammerstein (Contribution by), P.F. Hoekstra (Contribution by), Y. Iwasa (Contribution by), D. Messick (Contribution by), M. Morris (Contribution by), H.J. Poethke (Contribution by), R. Selten (Contribution by), A. Shmida (Contribution by), F.J. Weissing (Contribution by)
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By Reinhard Selten (Editor), I. Eshel (Contribution by), J.W. Friedman (Contribution by), R. Gardner (Contribution by), P. Hammerstein (Contribution by), P.F. Hoekstra (Contribution by), Y. Iwasa (Contribution by), D. Messick (Contribution by), M. Morris (Contribution by), H.J. Poethke (Contribution by), R. Selten (Contribution by), A. Shmida (Contribution by), F.J. Weissing (Contribution by)
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There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable str...


