What are our reasons for acting? Morality purports to give us these reasons, and so do norms of prudence and the laws of society. The theory of practical reason assesses the authority of these potentially competing claims, and for this reason philosophers with a wide range of interests have converged on the topic of reasons for action. This volume contains eleven new essays on practical reason by leading and emerging philosophers. Topics include the differences between practical and theoretical rationality, practical conditionals and the wide-scope ought, the explanation of action, the sources of reasons, and the relationship between morality and reasons for action. The volume will be essential reading for all philosophers interested in ethics and practical reason.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||6.20(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.90(d)|
About the Author
David Sobel is Robert R. Chambers Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and the Moral Sciences at the University of Nebraska.
Steven Wall is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut.
Table of Contents
Notes on the contributors page vii
1 Introduction David Sobel Steven Wall 1
2 Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality Michael E. Bratman 13
3 Reasons: practical and adaptive Joseph Raz 37
4 The explanatory role of being rational Michael Smith 58
5 Practical competence and fluent agency Peter Railton 81
6 Practical conditionals James Dreier 116
7 Authority and second-personal reasons for acting Stephen Darwall 134
8 Promises, reasons, and normative powers Gary Watson 155
9 Regret and irrational action Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson 179
10 Mackie's motivational argument Philip Clark 200
11 The truth in Ecumenical Expressivism Michael Ridge 219
12 Voluntarist reasons and the sources of normativity Ruth Chang 243