This book focuses on the antitrust process and how that process affects the efficiency of antitrust law enforcement. The contributors share a wide range of experiences in the antitrust process, including academia, the legal environment, and both private and public sectors. The book deals first with merger activities, followed by non-merger enforcement initiatives and concludes with an examination of the future role of antitrust.
Table of Contents1 Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process.- 2 Overenforcement in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Second Request Process.- 3 The Merger Guidelines As Applied.- 4 Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries.- 5 The Efficiencies Defense in Merger Cases.- 6 Buyers, Market Power, and Market Definition.- 7 Merger Enforcement at the Reagan/Bush FTC.- 8 Winners and Losers in the Settlement of Merger Litigation.- 9 Efficiency Lost?: The Microsoft Consent Decree.- 10 Predatory Pricing in the Retail Trade: The Wal-Mart Case.- 11 Guilt by Association: An Analysis of Nonprice Horizontal Restraint Enforcement.- 12 Antitrust, Economics, and “Reality”.