Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights

by Douglas A. Macgregor

Overview

Are we prepared to meet the challenges of the next war? What should our military look like? What lessons have we learned from recent actions in Afghanistan and Iraq? Macgregor has captured the attention of key leaders and inspired a genuine public debate on military reform. With the dangerous world situation of the early 21st century-and possible flashpoints ranging from the Middle East to the Far East-interservice cooperation in assembling small, mobile units and a dramatically simplified command structure is essential. MacGregor's controversial ideas, favored by the current Bush administration, would reduce timelines for deployment, enhance responsiveness to crises, and permit rapid decision-making and planning.The Army is the nation's primary instrument of land warfare, but what capabilities can the Army field today, and what is the Joint Commander likely to need tomorrow? Stuck with a force structure that hasn't changed since Word War II, as well as an outdated command system, today's Army faces potential failure in a modern war. Without a conceptual redefinition of warfare as a joint operation, a new military culture that can execute joint expeditionary warfare will not emerge. New technology both compels and enables evolution of the armed forces' organization. MacGregor's visionary plan to integrate ground maneuver forces with powerful strike assets is the foundation for a true revolution in military affairs, and has sparked heated debates in policy and military circles.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780313361579
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date:	09/30/2003
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	320
Product dimensions:	6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.67(d)

About the Author

DOUGLAS A. MACGREGOR is a Colonel with the Center for Technology and National Security at the National Defense University. A West Point graduate, he served in Desert Storm, earning a bronze star with V device for valor for his leadership of combat troops. He is the author of Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Praeger, 1997) and The Soviet-East German Military Alliance (1989). He holds an M.A. in comparative politics and a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Viginia.

Table of Contents

Figures
Acknowledgments
Foreword by General Sir Rupert Smith KCB DSO OBE QGM
Foreword by Major General Robert H. Scales Jr., USA (Ret.)
I: Introduction
The Roadmap to Joint Expeditionary Operations in Land Warfare
II: Transforming to What?
Why Army Transformation Stalled
The Illusion of Change
A Third Way to Transform Land Power
Six Recommendations
III: War and Globalization
Whom Do We Fight? Where Do We Fight?
How Do We Fight?
Conclusion
IV: It's about Effects
Moving beyond Cold War Metrics of Military Power
Linking Ends and Means for Effect
Thinking about Effects—Kosovo
Achieving Synergy in EBO: North Africa, 1940
Fighting for Effects Today
Precision Thinking
Conclusion
V: Concepts and Architectures for Joint Expeditionary Warfare
An Intellectual Approach to Transformation
Operational Architecture for Joint Expeditionary Warfare
Forget the Old Rules
Making Flatter Command Structures Work
Form Should Follow Function in Command and Control
Command and Control for Global Joint Expeditionary Warfare
Conclusion
VI: Organizing for Global Joint Expeditionary Warfare
The Age of "the Small, the Fast, and the Many"
Rethinking the Objective Force with a Transformational Approach
XVIII Airborne Corps: Spearhead of Army Transformation
The Light Reconnaissance Strike Group
The Airborne–Air Assault Group
The Aviation Combat Group
The Early Deploying Support Group
The C4I Group
Additional Capability-Based Formations in III Corps
Conclusion
VII: Getting Ready for the Fight!
Training for Readiness to Deploy and Fight
Toward a Joint Rotational Solution
Conclusion
VIII: Why the Hell Do We Still Have Troops in Iceland?
Where Are the Soldiers?
Streamlining Army Command and Control
Implementing Army Transformation
Conclusion
IX: Leadership and Change in a Cultural Revolution
The New Army Leader
From Garrison to War
Danger: Old Cultures in New Worlds
Making a Revolution
Developing New Leaders
Education for Military Excellence
Conclusion
X: Epilogue or Prologue?
The Defining Moment of War
Toward a New American Way of War
Civilians Must Lead
Appendix: Technology for Land Forces in Joint Expeditionary Warfare
Adapting the Acquisition Process to Soldier Need
Understanding the Army in War
The Fight for Information
The Battle of Seconds
The Battle of Minutes
The Battle of Hours and Days
Conclusion
Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Military Terms
Index

What People are Saying About This

Thomas G. McInerney

"Colonel Doug Macgregor was a courageous combat commander in Desert Storm and is an even more courageous leader in transforming U.S. Land Warfare against an entrenched mindset that was proven wrong in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Airmen and soldiers must read this book!"

Congressman Jim Cooper

"Peek inside the Pentagon and see the U.S. Army faking transformation, refusing to reform the inside, and betting on unproven technology like Stryker and Future Combat Systems to keep Army troopers relevant. Col. Macgregor loves the Army enough to tell the truth: six ways to meet and beat the threats of the future."

Congressman Mack Thornberry

"Thought provoking and insightful, this book is a must read for leaders who care about shaping America's future fighting force. Colonel Macgregor continues to lead the way in shaping thoughtful solutions to transforming the nation's military."

Frank Carlucci

"Colonel Macgregor provides anew and vibrant look at the age-old issue of military reform in Transformation Under Fire. His expert use of history and personal combat experience creates a compelling case for landpower's crucial role in joint expeditionary warfare."

Admiral Dennis Blair

"Not everyone will agree with every point in this controversial book, but it deserves to be read and engaged seriously by those who lead the armed forces and care about transforming them to be dominant in the future."

Newt Gingrich

"Colonel Macgregor is to the Information Age joint military what Billy Mitchell was to airpower and what Liddell Hart, Fuller, DeGaulle and Guderian were to armored warfare. He understands what has to be done, understands the principles for creating a 21st century joint military, and has outlined a practical guide to America's next quarter century of military effectiveness. Every citizen who cares about national security should read this book and every professional who wants to be competent in the information age MUST read this book."

Williamson Murray

"Colonel Douglas Macgregor has once again pointed the way towards real transformation and innovation in the army. It is because he brings the combination of a military intellectual and a 'muddy boots' soldier to his work that he is able to see the potential for real change. This is a book for all those who give a damn about America's defense in the 21st century."

Editorial Reviews

Macgregor, now stationed at National Defense University, has a knack for skillfully blending historical examples from the past with powerful arguments about the future. The combination is both thoroughly educational and extremely stimulating. This is a serious book worthy of reading by today's field grade officers and civilian policymakers interested in arguments that challenge the status quo. It is also highly recommended for joint combat developers and force planners at U.S. Joint Forces Command….Professionals who want to think differently and examine the kinds of forces and capabilities that can meet new challenges and unexpected circumstances should start with Transformation Under Fire.” —Marine Corps Gazette

“In today's Global War on Terrorism, the Pentagon's senior civilian and military leaders—who should read this book—must be afraid of nothing, not even a new idea.” —Military Heritage

“The book is scholarly, well researched, cohesive, and technically written in a stimulating manner…Macgregor's book is ideal for reading at the war colleges, for the professional soldier and military planner, and for advanced courses in strategic defense.” —Perspectives on Political Science

“Has delivered another insightful vision in his latest book….Transformation Under Fire is a must-read for both military professionals and public officials charged with overseeing defense programs. It is likely to figure prominently in ongoing discussions of defense reform. The value of this book lies in its superb analysis of the current geopolitical environment and the author's coupling of this analysis with an informed assessment of the impact of information technology on warfare to support his proposals….Offers a strident critique of recent Army transformation efforts while also providing the reader a comprehensive vision of near-term changes within the department of Defense that could truly enhance our military's ability to conduct joint expeditionary operations….Essential reading for military professionals and for those with oversight of defense programs.” —Army Magazine

“Macgregor's book is the best tradition of military theorists, whose ideas transformed armies to meet the challenges of WWII: Hans Von Seckt, B. H. Liddell Hart, Charles de Gaulle, and Heinz Guderian. Macgregor presents the first coherent view of how the information age should transform the way we organize for war. The question now remains whether the U.S. Army will heed his calls for true or continue to cede more and more of its missions to the Marine Corps, which has embraced expeditionary warfare. Macgregor takes to task the leadership culture that stifles change; but more importantly, he sketches out a realistic, immediate path to true transformation that will vault the Army out of exile at the Pentagon and back into the forefront of the Nation's fight in the war on terrorism.” —Armor

“Transformation Under Fire offers a strident critique of recent Army transformation efforts while also providing the reader a comprehensive vision of near-term changes within the department of defense that could truly enhance our military's ability to conduct joint expeditionary operations….Essential reading for military professionals and for those with oversight of defense programs.” —Army

“Though widely considered a maverick, Col Macgregor enjoyed influence beyond his rank. Two of his books—Breaking the Phalanx, published in 1997, and the more recent Transformation Under Fire—were considered must-reads within the army, and some of the changes he advocated have been adopted in some form.” —London Financial Times

“Found a receptive audience in Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's office….The defense secretary is intrigued by Macgregor's thinking, which he has refined in a new book, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing The Way America Fights, due out in the fall: three to five rapidly deployable battle groups is the kind of force Rumsfeld believes is necessary in the global war on terrorism.” —The Washington Post

From the Publisher

America's Unfinished War--And The Effort To Redeem It

By Douglas A. Macgregor

Before leaving Iraq in 1991, many gulf war veterans with frontline experience against the Iraqi army concluded that Desert Storm had been a kind of Iraqi Dunkirk, an unfinished war or, more precisely, a strategic defeat for American arms.

To many, the generals' declarations of victory over a weak and incapable Iraqi army seemed hollow. By the time 500,000 American and allied combat troops attacked on Feb. 24, 1991, no more than 200,000 of the 380,000 Iraqi troops originally deployed in and around Kuwait were left to defend against coalition ground forces.

In the fighting that followed, 87,000 Iraqi troops were taken prisoner and an estimated 25,000 Iraqis were killed, but Saddam Hussein's regime endured.

Despite the overwhelming force that President George H.W. Bush provided, Desert Storm's most important objective, the destruction of the Republican Guard corps, was not accomplished. The generals knew that, without the Republican Guard to protect him and impose his tyranny on the people of Iraq, Hussein would be vulnerable to attack from his numerous enemies inside Iraq's borders, but it was not to be.

The palsied movement of the U.S. Army's most powerful combat formation, the VII Corps, a force with more than 100,000 troops and 1,000 M1 tanks, ensured that as many as 80,000 Iraqi Republican Guards--along with hundreds of tanks, armored fighting vehicles and armed helicopters--would escape to mercilessly crush uprisings across Iraq with a ruthlessness not seen since Josef Stalin.

Millions of Arabs and Kurds inside Iraq were consigned to a fate no less terrible than the fate of millions of Europeans condemned to 50 years of Soviet occupation at the end of World War II.

Sadly, the same American government that incited the rebellion against Hussein's regime simply stood by and did nothing. Under orders not to interfere, VII Corps soldiers watched from their positions along the Euphrates River as Republican Guards smashed Hussein's opponents.

America intervened in Iraq in March 2003 for many reasons, one of which was to redeem the strategic defeat of 1991. Pushing the Iraqi army out of Kuwait was never enough to satisfy America's strategic interests in the Persian Gulf any more than expelling the British army from the European continent had been enough for the Germans in 1940.

Mixed feelings on occupation

Today, Americans are justifiably delighted with the removal of Hussein's regime, but they have mixed feelings regarding the occupation of Iraq. Many have yet to determine whether America went to Iraq to liberate an oppressed population and to remove a dictator with aspirations to build nuclear weapons or whether the goal was to incorporate first Iraq and then the whole Middle East into a vague American version of a globalized world.

Still, after two years of violence in Iraq, any positive sign, such as the election in January, is welcomed. To the advocates for the Bush administration's policy of installing democracy with military power, the elections vindicated the president's policies.

But to the critics of the administration in the U.S. and Europe, the Iraq emerging from the two-year occupation presents a different picture.

In the "winner-take-all" political culture of the Arab world, the Sunni Arabs of central Iraq saw no reason to legitimize the election with their participation. Less than 2 percent voted. Participation among the long-oppressed Kurds and Shiite Arabs was predictably high; the incentives for Kurds and Shiite Arabs to vote were strong.

Now, regional experts are troubled by the slow buildup of new Iraqi Army units consisting mainly of Shiite Arabs and Kurds.

Many fear that American military power may have inadvertently created in two years what Iranian military power could not achieve through eight years of war with Hussein: the foundation for an Iranian client state in Iraq. Frankly, it is too soon to pass judgment.

Look to history

What Americans should remember is that the parliamentary democracies established by the British and French in their former Arab colonies and protectorates did not survive the departure of the British and French armies.

The British who worked hardest to build the foundation for democratic governance discovered quickly that only institutions fundamentally Arab in character and origin had any chance of survival. And these institutions have little in common with English-speaking concepts of government.

Over the last 12 years of the Clinton and Bush administrations, American foreign policy has tended to focus Americans' attention on the surface mechanics of democracy, on popular elections in the aftermath of American military intervention in Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo rather than on the true foundations of democratic government and the rule of law--among them, a strong civil society with a complex market economy that supports a thriving middle class.

Unfortunately, 12 years of economic sanctions destroyed Iraq's middle class, and Hussein's skilled manipulation of ethnic and religious rivalries undermined what little cohesion existed in the country before 1991, making it very unlikely that democracy of the kind that English-speaking peoples struggled 500 years to achieve will now emerge in Iraq after only two or three years of American military occupation.

The true test of whether democracy has sunk real roots into the deserts of Southwest Asia will come when America withdraws its forces. Then, we will know whether America's strategic defeat of 1991 has indeed been redeemed..

Chicago Tribune