This discipline has become more reflective in recent years. It has also become blatantly philosophical, which is itself cause for reflection. The philosophy of psychology has not been exactly a burgeoning field, and yet psychologists and philosophers of all persuasions are writing philosophical psychology. Perhaps all this activity merely reflects the uneasy bifurcation of psychology into biological and cognitive domains. After all, there were similar flurries in the 1920s and 1950s when the discipline assumed new directions. But, before, there were too many things to do; scientific knowing seemed so compelling and so singular in methodology. Today, the entire enterprise is much more uncertain, and not just psychology, but all human scientific inquiry. The fun damental questions remain much the same, of course; what has changed is that philosophers are explicitly addressing questions of psy chology and psychologists are at least implicitly engaged in philosophy. The bounderies are no longer clear cut! Theoretical psychology is as much the doing of philosophy as it is of experimental research. Volume 4 of these Annals attests to this state of affairs. The psychologists' style reflects their philosophical understanding; the philosophers differ according to what they take to be psychological knowledge.
Table of Contents1. From the Testimonies of the Senses to the Paradoxes of World View.- Tennessen and the Problem of Conceptual Schemes.- In Defense of Realism and Scientism.- Talking Turkey about Sense Stuff.- How to View the Whirl of Testimonies and Make Sense of Paradox.- From the Testimonies of the Senses to the Paradoxes of World View: Reply to Commentators.- 2. On the Possibility of Establishing a Metascientific Foundation for Psychoanalysis.- Psychoanalysis and Hermeneutics.- Psychoanalysis as a Practical Hermeneutical Science.- The Construal of Psychoanalysis as a “Practical Hermeneutic Science”: An Avoidance of Critical Issues.- Conventions and Interpretation.- Reality, Psychoanalysis, and Hermeneutical Sciences: Reply to Commentators.- 3. Personality Psychology and the Hypothetical-Deductive Model of Explanation.- The Hypothetical-Deductive Model in Personality Psychology.- Problems with Hypothetical-Deductive Explanation: Methodological or Theoretical?.- Breaking the Objectivist Stranglehold on Personality Psychology.- Personality Psychology and the Hypothetical-Deductive Model of Explanation: Reply to Commentators.- 4. A Cognitive Reinterpretation of Classical Introspectionism: The Relation between Introspection and Altered States of Consciousness and Their Mutual Relevance for a Cognitive Psychology of Metaphor and Felt Meaning.- Titchener’s Relativistic View of Observation and Psychological Processes.- True and False and Good and Bad in Connection with Cognition, Affection, and Volition.- Professor Hunt, Meet Professor Whitehead.- A Cognitive Reinterpretation of Classical Introspectionism: Reply to Commentators.- 5. The Concept of Belief in Cognitive Theory.- Leaving Belief Behind.- But What Is Belief Itself?.- An Ambiguity in Egan’s Concept of Belief.- The Concept of Belief in Cognitive Theory: Reply to Commentators.- Book Review. The Right Stuff: A Review of D. N. Robinson’s The Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.- Author Index.