The contributions in this volume result from discussions on and with John R. Searle, containing Searle's own latest views - including his seminal ideas on Rationality in Action. The collection provides a good basis for advanced seminar debates in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy, and will also stimulate some further research on all of the three main topics.
Table of ContentsIntroduction. Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality; J.R. Searle. Interview with John R. Searle; R. Stoecker. Speech Acts. How Performatives Don't Work; G. Grewendorf. Are Performative Utterances Declarations? R.M. Harnish. Expressibility, Explicability, and Taxonomy. Some Remarks on the Principle of Expressibility; F. Kannetzky. Expressing an Intentional State; A. Kemmerling. On the Proper Treatment of Performatives; A. Martinich. Why Do We Mean Something Rather Than Nothing? C. Plunze. What Is an Illocutionary Point? M. Siebel. Searle on Meaning and Action; D. Vanderveken. Mind. Understanding Utterances and Other Actions; T. Bartelborth, O. Scholz. Intrinsic Intentionality; W. Lenzen. Causal Reduction, Ontological Reduction, and First-Person Ontology. Notes on Searle's Views about Consciousness; M. Nida-Rümelin. The Hidden Algebra of the Mind from a Linguistic Perspective; T. Roeper. Identification and Misidentification; A. Stroll. Social Reality. Searle on Social Reality: Process Is Prior to Product; S.B. Barnes. On Searle's Collective Intentionality. Some Notes; G. Meggle. Searle's Theory of Institutional Facts: A Program of Critical Revision; J. Moural. True Reality and Real Truth; D. Sosa. Searle, Collective Intentionality, and Social Institutions; R. Tuomela. New Perspectives. The Classical Model of Rationality and Its Weaknesses; J.R. Searle. Contributors.